Abstract: Under the semantic view of theories, structural accounts of representation that invoke the mathematical notion of isomorphism are prevalent. However, isomorphism accounts face significant objections, with the most problematic question being how the physical world can be placed in the mathematical relationship with abstract models.
I compare two accounts of representation presented by Bas van Fraassen and David Wallace. While van Fraassen's account is based on isomorphisms, he supplements it with an appeal to the intentions of scientists, indexically locating users in the logical space of the theory. On the other hand, Wallace's 'theories and theorizing' account attempts to forgo the aforementioned issues by arguing that any scientific theory in use already has its own theory of representation built in - and that this process is not viciously circular.
To evaluate these proposals, I will focus on the role of reference, indexicality and empirical grounding in these accounts. I will argue that, because of disanalogies between languages and scientific theories, Wallace's account is less persuasive than van Fraassen's despite strong thematic similarities - and that it may be insufficient for Wallace's metaphysical view of maths-first structural realism.
The PoP-grunch (Philosophy of Physics Graduate Lunch) is a weekly informal seminar in which graduate students in Philosophy of Physics present their work in progress.
Philosophy of Physics Graduate Lunch Seminar Convenor: Eleanor March
