In my talk, I will examine the phenomenological character of Heidegger’s transformation of Kant’s transcendental philosophy. In a first part, I will focus on the notion of intentionality and its central role for reformulating the transcendental setting as a “correlation” (of comportment and world) instead of an a priori “formation” (of “matter” given to the senses). While Heidegger takes the notion of intentionality from Husserl’s Logical Investigations, he distances himself from a Cartesian moment he sees both in Husserl’s and Kant’s conceptions of transcendental philosophy. Heidegger’s Aristotelian interpretation of intentionality as everyday “comportments” in 1924 (GA 18) paves the way for his fundamental-ontological, non-Cartesian version of transcendental philosophy as developed in Being and Time. In a second part of my talk I will turn to Heidegger’s reading of Kant in the lecture course Logic. The Question of Truth from 1925/26. Here Heidegger aims to introduce temporality and finitude into the Kantian “I think.” Finally, in a third part I turn to the question how a phenomenological transcendental philosophy according to Heidegger relates to Kant’s and Husserl’s diverging doctrines of “transcendental idealism.” Is Heidegger a strong or a weak correlationist and is his strategy to avoid this question successful?
Post-Kantian European Philosophy Seminar Convenors: Joseph Schear, Manuel Dries, and Mark Wrathall