Hegel has recently come under attack: It is argued that in some of his writings and lectures he has defended racist and pro-colonial views. What is more, it is argued that these racist and pro-colonial positions are not disconnected from his revered philosophy of freedom, but, on the contrary, internally related to his theory of human freedom. In this talk, I will be far from dismissing this critique. Indeed, I think there is no doubt that Hegel has argued in a racist and pro-colonial manner in these passages and that his statements are internally related to his conception of freedom, indeed to two of the most attractive features of his conception of freedom: first, that Hegel is interested in freedom not as a given potential, but insists that the reality of freedom depends on its actualization; second, that he thinks of this actualization as a social achievement that requires formation and cultivation. It is precisely in connection to the
actualization of freedom through cultivation, that Hegel inserts his racist and pro-colonial remarks. This clearly reveals that it is not impossible to give an interpretation of actualization through cultivation that is open to a racist and pro-colonial interpretation. That calls for our intense critical attention in thinking about the ways in which the process of actualization and education can be understood in such a manner that it does not underwrite these views. However, for such a critical endeavor it is essential to confront the possibility of theses perversions of our freedom, to understand why and how it may be internal to freedom that it can misconceive itself in such a way that it embraces and justifies unfreedom. Despite the racist and pro-colonial views held by Hegel in the mentioned passages, his work can be extremely helpful in this regard. It can gives us the resources for an immanent critique of the coloniality of “our” freedom. This is the case because Hegel develops a conception of freedom, that sees true freedom as arising out of overcoming its self-misunderstanding as mastery. To reveal this, I will proceed in three steps: First, I will briefly outline Marx’s contrast between dogmatic and true critique to argue that Hegel is giving us the resources for a true critique of the “coloniality” of freedom. In a second step, I want to look at two examples that can show us how Hegel’s account starts from a “colonial” or imperial understanding of freedom to show that it invalidates itself. I will close with discussing the worry that this account still involves a normative justification of forms of oppression as necessary steps in the progress of freedom.
Post-Kantian European Philosophy Seminar Convenors: Joseph Schear, Manuel Dries, Kate Kirkpatrick and Mark Wrathall
