Post-Kantian European Philosophy Seminar (Tuesday - Week 8, MT25)
Tuesday 2 December, 4:00pm - 6:00pm
Ryle Room (20.339), Schwarzman Centre
Fridolin Neumann (Warwick): 'What is Ontological Failure? Perspectives from Heidegger and Beyond'
Abstract: In his influential interpretation of Heidegger, John Haugeland (2013 [2000]) describes a ‘failure of ontological truth’ as ‘a systematic breakdown that undermines everything’ – where an agent’s understanding of being, her self-disclosure, and her ability to discover entities of the respective kind all falter together. My paper explores this conception of ‘ontological failure’ to which the Heidegger of Being and Time is, arguably, committed. Following Haugeland, I approach ontological failure as an experience in which the understanding of being that enables our encounter with entities proves inadequate in this very encounter and is subsequently relinquished. Crucial here – and in need of explanation – is Haugeland’s claim that such failure is not merely a contingent occurrence but rather a response to a mismatch between an agent’s understanding of being and the entities she encounters. I develop this proposal through a reading of portions of Being and Time - most importantly, Heidegger’s analysis of the epistemic vices bound up with inauthenticity. If this is correct, Heidegger’s Kantian commitments – that all encounters with entities are enabled by an understanding of being – go hand in hand with an imperative to continually adapt these understandings of being to the entities encountered (Golob 2019). I suggest that this commits Heidegger to what Keiling (2015, 2019) calls ‘phenomenological realism’, defined by granting entities a ‘metametaphysical role’ or ontological normativity.