Abstract: When you know a proposition, that you know this proposition is not an unexplained or brute or fundamental fact, but rather is made the case by -- or, in the parlance of our times, is grounded in -- the obtaining of various conditions. What might these conditions be? Here, as always in philosophy, chaos reigns, and there is much dispute about the conditions for knowledge. However, it seems all sides must agree on one thing: truth is one of those conditions, so that, necessarily, if you know that p, then you know that p in part because it is true that p. I shall argue that, by considering cases in which what one knows is metaphysically overdetermined, we can see that this widely held thesis is demonstrably false. In other words, knowledge is not partially grounded in truth. But I do not deny that knowledge entails truth, so we are left with a residual puzzle: what explains why knowledge entails truth, if not the former's being necessarily grounded in the latter? Several hypotheses are explored, and the most plausible is shown to have direct bearing on the prospects for analyzing knowledge.
Please note: The seminar runs from 15:00 to 17:00, drinks are held in the Faculty Hub afterwards.
Registration: If you do not hold a university card, please contact the seminar convenor or at least two working days before a seminar to register your attendance.
Jowett Society Organising Committee: Joshua Loo, Zachary Lang, Xavier Morales Zayas and Sepehr Razavi | Jowett Society Website
