David Lewis’s well-known response to the Consequence Argument for incompatibilism, in ‘Are we free to break the laws?’, trades on the distinction between being able to do something that would be or cause a miracle and being able to do something such that, if one did it, a law would have been broken. In response, van Inwagen in effect insists that this is a distinction without a difference: either way, deterministic agents with the ability to do otherwise would have to be miracle-workers. I argue that van Inwagen’s worry has some bite, and that the right compatibilist solution to the problem is to come up with a theory of abilities that explains why the above distinction holds rather than (as Lewis does in AWFTBL) merely stipulating that it does.
After the talks all are invited to socialise and continue discussion over drinks in the Ryle Room.
If you would like to join for dinner after the drinks reception, please email email@example.com
Jowett Society Organising Committee: Harry Alanen, Christopher Benzenberg, Sara Chan, Sean Costello, Alasdair Criag, Katherine Hong, Sebastian Liu, Chiara Martini, Arnaud Petit, Beatriz Santos and Lewis Wang. | Jowett Society Webpage