Abstract: Kuhn introduced the idea of paradigms to capture the way that individual hypotheses in science are assessed in the context of a much broader framework of ideas and values (a ‘disciplinary matrix’), and also to refer to ‘exemplars’ that set the standard for what he called ‘normal science’ (the prime example being Newton’s Principia). Kuhn’s conception of the history of science in terms of normal science, crises caused by the accumulation and significance of anomalies, and revolutionary science resulting in a ‘paradigm shift’ (which he also describes as a ‘world-change’) have been hugely influential.[1] Kuhn’s impact is evident in the following statement in which he is credited with inspiring, “an approach to historical and social studies of science, in which scientific facts were seen as products of scientists’ socially conditioned investigations rather than as objective representations of nature.” (Harvard STS 2025). Such work aims to explain the history of science in terms of economic, psychological and social factors rather than evidence and reasoning. Moreover, Kuhn’s account of the history of science is often taken to support antirealism, social constructivism or relativism of various kinds. The problem at the centre of the controversy about Kuhn’s work, and many debates about the epistemology of science, is called the ‘underdetermination problem’. The underdetermination problem arises if more than one theory is compatible with a given body of evidence, and philosophers give arguments to show that this is always the case in principle. However, the only question relevant to theory choice is whether alternative theories are actually available, or can plausibly be thought to be actually available relatively soon. In the history of science there are many cases in which two or more theories fit all the available evidence at a given time, but one or more is not compatible with new evidence so that theory-choice is not underdetermined by the evidence because only one theory accounts for it in detail. More generally, Kuhn’s claims about paradigms and underdetermination have been contested in respect of the Copernican Revolution, and other revolutions in physics. The Chemical Revolution is one of his central examples, but it does not support Kuhn’s account of paradigms and underdetermination, and can be used to illustrate its many failings and to counter widespread myths about the history of science.
[1] In his later work (1977) he distanced himself from how he is often interpreted but it is far less well known.
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Jowett Society Organising Committee: Joshua Loo, Zachary Lang, Xavier Morales Zayas and Sepehr Razavi | Jowett Society Website
