The virtuous person has a stable disposition to do the right thing for the right reasons, with the right feelings, and the right motivations. Many philosophers—such as Julia Annas and Rosalind Hursthouse—have claimed that the virtuous person must also be articulate. Whereas others—including Julia Driver, Iris Murdoch, and John McDowell—have denied this claim.
Debate between proponents of each view has largely been about whether inarticulate agents can ‘match’ articulate ones and so be classified as possessing some virtue or another. But, in this talk, I want to focus on cases where articulacy seems to make one less virtuous or not virtuous at all. Two types of cases where it seems to have this effect are those which require modesty and those which urgently require a direct response. I shall argue that, in such cases, having an articulate grasp of one’s reasons is a hindrance to being virtuous.
If I am right about these cases, then we have reason to pursue an intermediate account. Namely, one where the virtuous person has the general capacity to articulate their reasons for acting. However, that person is unable to exercise that capacity in certain situations. By developing some remarks made by Bernard Williams and John McDowell about character and moral reasoning, I will proceed to sketch such an account.
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