Wesley J. Park (St Anne's College): 'Shame in Aristotle's Ethics'
What is the so-called ‘moral emotion’ of shame? And might it be a good thing? The question for Aristotle in Book IV of the Ethics is whether shame (aidōs) is a virtue. I regard his answer to this question as encapsulating the following argument. The first premise is that shame is more like a feeling than a state. And the second premise is that shame is a good thing conditionally. The conclusion is that shame is not properly spoken of as a virtue. In this essay, I shall defend the Aristotelian thesis that shame is not a virtue. I first argue that the mean in connection with shame is like analogous to a feeling and disanalogous to a virtue. I then argue that there are different conditions of the goodness of the virtues and of the mean in connection with shame, respectively. Finally, I argue that the mean in connection with shame does not meet Aristotle’s requirement on the virtues. My conclusion is that Aristotle’s conception gives us a wiser understanding of shame—what it is but, more importantly, whether and to what extent it is good.
