Rei Takahashi (St Cross College): 'Do Groups Have Well-Being?: Objections from Hedonism and the Consciousness Requirement.'
Do groups have well-being? Despite its importance to social science, moral and political philosophy, and philosophy of law, this question has received surprisingly little attention in the literature. I defend the view that some groups have well-being. I present one positive argument for group well-being. I argue that many plausible theories of well-being establish group well-being. I then turn to two possible objections. The first comes from hedonism about well-being. If it turns out that phenomenal hedonism is true, it seems that groups cannot have well-being. The second objection comes from a widely accepted view that phenomenal consciousness is necessary for being a welfare subject. In response to the first objection, I argue that the objection fails because even if hedonism is true and no groups have the capacity for having pleasure and pain, they can still have well-being. For the second objection, I argue that we should weaken the consciousness requirement as the original requirement is undermotivated and faces a counterexample. I appeal to a metaphysical view called perdurantism in the course of this discussion.
