Workshop in Ancient Philosophy (Thursday - Week 2, TT25)

Abstract: In this paper I argue that the elenctic method is used in a constructive, as well as destructive, manner Republic I, in several respects: Elenchus establishes epistemic norms, facilitates self-knowledge of belief relevant to inquiry, even, sometimes, previously disavowed beliefs, reveals reasons for belief, and yields bases for future first-order inquiry. The elenctic method also implies first-personal plural epistemic authority about belief: Our agreement on what I believe, consistent with epistemic norms, is authoritative over my solo claims to belief. I then argue that the elenchus is incorporated into the method of dialectic in first-order inquiry later in Rep., such that critical reflection and cross-examination of one another is characteristic of both education of guardians and their activity as rulers. This interpersonal feature of dialectic is plausibly more epistemically reliable than (largely) solo inquiry, implying a social element to Platonic epistemology, and raising the possibility of first-personal epistemic authority over first-order knowledge. I further explore, however, a more radical ‘Platonic’ social epistemology, according to which thought is a fundamentally dialectical activity, the solo practice of which is a derivative and epistemically impoverished version of interpersonal dialectic.