Abstract: The concept of what is ‘up to us’ (ἐφ᾽ἡμῖν) is central to Epictetus’ philosophy. Earlier Stoics (in particular Chrysippus) seem to have used this term to argue that, even in a deterministic cosmos, we are still morally responsible for our actions, since our assents and impulses are up to us and not anything outside of us. For Epictetus, what is up to us takes on a much more central ethical role, describing only what is (in all cases) free, unimpeded and unconstrained. By understanding what things are up to us (namely our prohairesis and its activities) and limiting our desires and attachment to only those, we can achieve unassailable happiness and avoid ever being frustrated in our desires, since they cannot be externally interfered with.
Based on these central premises, as well as Epictetus’ claim in Diss 4.1.73 that walking is not in our power, since our body can be physically restrained from walking, most commentators assume that, for Epictetus, our actions are not up to us, since they can be externally hindered. However, given the close association of what is up to us and moral responsibility in earlier Stoicism, does this put Epictetus into the position of denying that we are morally responsible for our actions? I seek to answer this question by more closely examining Epictetus’ claims about action, impulse and what is up to as, as well as their relationship to the views of earlier Stoics.
If you would like to go out to dinner with the speaker after the talk, then please contact the chair of the meeting (listed above) before Tuesday of this week. The meals of the chair and the speaker are covered by the faculty; others attend at their own expense
Workshop in Ancient Philosophy Convenors: Alexander Bown (MT), Marion Durand (HT), Ursula Coope (TT).
