Metaphysics, Language, and Epistemology Group

Abstract: Most people want to make the world better, not worse. This connection between normative belief and desire is hard to spell out in Bayesian terms. Various simple and popular models turn out to be untenable, for reasons related to Lewis's argument against "Desire As Belief" and his apparent refutation of Stalnaker's Thesis. I argue that the problems arise from the information-sensitivity of normative concepts (a feature they share with conditionals and epistemic modals), and suggest two ways to get around them.

Registration: If you do not hold a university card, please contact the seminar convenor or admin@philosophy.ox.ac.uk at least two working days before a seminar to register your attendance.

_{Metaphysics and Epistemology Group Convenors: Nick Jones, Mona Simion, Bernhard Salow and Alex Kaiserman}