Abstract: Deliberative normativism is the popular view that to deliberate is to seek out the relevant normative considerations. I reject this view. I defend deliberative extra-normativism: the nascent view that we can deliberate without employing normative concepts. My defence of deliberative extra-normativism is conditional upon the Robustness Thesis: the view that normative judgements ascribe irreducibly normative properties. I argue that proponents of the Robustness Thesis—robust realists and normative error theorists alike—should accept deliberative extra-normativism. I end by arguing that deliberative extra-normativism also insulates robust realists and normative error theorists from pending challenges. First, deliberative extra-normativism offers a blueprint for other kinds of extra-normativism—in particular: doxastic extra-normativism and love extra-normativism—that enables normative error theorists to avoid the challenges that they cannot accommodate belief or love. Second, deliberative extra-normativism enables robust realists to avoid the challenge that their interpersonal commitments are objectionably conditional upon the existence of irreducibly normative properties.
