Title: 'Principle and constructive theories of physical probability and Bell inequalities'
Abstract: This talk is about physical, as opposed to epistemic probability, and on
(i) a principle theory, its application to the EPRB setup, and Bell inequalities.
(ii) a constructive theory, as based on no-collapse quantum mechanics, similarly applied.
(iii) the relation between the two theories.
The principle theory offers direct justificatory support for the constructive theory, but its postulates, translated into no-collapse theory, are also implied by the constructive theory. This curious mutual containment resembles that between Einstein’s principle theory of special relativity, based on the light postulate and the relativity principle, and a constructive theory based on Minkowski spacetime. (The comparison may not go very deep, and needs to be tested, but is a steer in the right direction.)
The conclusion of (i) is that given the principle theory, and given no action-at-a-distance (locality), Bell inequalities are forced, with two provisos: one is if retrocausal action (or equivalently, superdeterminism) is operating, and the other is if remote experiments do not have unique outcomes. If the former is ruled out, then from the principle theory, locality and violation of Bell inequalities imply many worlds -- a surprisingly general conclusion.
The constructive theory bears this out. Applied to the EPRB set up, and given no action at a distance by means of unitary transformations, it explicitly shows there is no distant action on probabilities, despite violating Bell inequalities.
The constructive theory is based on https://arxiv.org/abs/2404.12954. The principle theory is more recent, in http://arxiv.org/abs/2505.06983.
Philosophy of Physics Seminar Convenors: Oliver Pooley and James Read | Philosophy of Physics Group Website
