Lewis Williams

Lewis Williams
2025 - 2028 Early Career Research Fellow in Philosophy, Merton College, University of Oxford
2021 – 2025 DPhil in Philosophy, Linacre College, University of Oxford

Why Moral Paradoxes Actually Support Moral Nihilism (and Why That Matters). The Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming).

Revolutionary Normative Subjectivism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy (2025): 1–19.

Moral Nihilism—So What?. Ethics 134 (2023): 108–121.

My current research concerns the relationship between normativity and deliberation. My work in this area touches upon normative nihilism, meta-normative pluralism, and uncertainty in meta-ethics.

 

Other research interests include the ethics of AI (especially value alignment), duties of beneficence, and philosophical questions surrounding meaning in life.