Philosophy of Mind Seminar (Friday - Week 1, MT25)

Philosophy of mind

Abstract: Why is it that if I believe the CIA is persecuting me, I am considered to have a mental disorder, but if I believe that global elites are conspiring against us, I am not? This asymmetry between delusional persecutory beliefs (DPBs) and conspiracy theory beliefs (CTBs) is puzzling. Both posit conspiracies, are often implausible, and resist counterevidence. Yet only DPBs are generally considered pathological. What, if anything, justifies this asymmetry? This question matters theoretically and practically: in clinical, legal, and bioethical contexts, labelling conditions as pathological has significant consequences. I argue that the asymmetry in the pathological status can be defended. DPBs are self-referential, idiosyncratic, and often grounded in hallucinations, unlike CTBs. Individually, these features don’t justify the asymmetry, but together they provide some reason to accept it. To make this case, I adopt an ability-based view of mental disorder and argue that in DPBs different types of abilities may be impaired.

Philosophy of Mind Seminar convenors: Mike Martin and Matthew Parrott