Workshop in Ancient Philosophy (Thursday - Week 6, HT26)

Abstract: In Categories 7 Aristotle argues that, unlike other relatives, the correlative of cognitive states are not simultaneous by nature with these states but are prior to them. The philosophical motivation behind this view is clear. Through it, Aristotle shows that the inclusion of cognitive states in the category of relatives does not entail his predecessors’ subjectivistic view that the objects of knowledge do not exist independently of knowledge, i.e., of their being known. It is, however, unclear whether this view has also epistemological implications, specifically whether it can counter Protagoras’ relativism, by guaranteeing that we can know things as they are and not merely as they appear to us. In my talk, I show that Aristotle’s arguments for the ontological priority of the objects of knowledge rests on an implicit assumption that counters relativism. In so doing, I address the question of why these arguments rest on the assumption that the object of cognitive states are not their correlative strictly speaking but independent objects. I argue that this assumption reflects Aristotle’s view that cognitive states receive their epistemic status from their objects and that this view explains how Aristotle’s contention against Protagoras that the measure of all things is not simply a man but the man who knows counters relativism.

Registration: If you do not hold a university card, please contact the seminar convenor or admin@philosophy.ox.ac.uk at least two working days before a seminar to register your attendance.