Abstract: Science influences its targets in various epistemically distinct ways (see Marchionni et al., 2024). This influence sometimes has harmful or beneficial outcomes, which raises questions about the moral responsibility of scientists for them. Since in science, “the ethical and the epistemic are intertwined… but… not merged” (Solomon, 2012, p. 335), discussions of the moral responsibilities of scientists for such outcomes should examine each epistemic mechanism where science influences its targets separately. This paper examines the moral responsibilities of scientists for the outcomes of the epistemic mechanism of reactivity, which is roughly when agents react to a belief inspired by a scientific prediction by modifying their behavior to obtain their goals and thereby influence the value of the target variable (and “change” the prediction’s truth value). I argue that the received view on the moral responsibilities of scientists (see, e.g., Kitcher, 2001; Douglas, 2009; Lacey, 2016; Resnik & Elliott, 2016), according to which, roughly speaking, scientists are generally morally responsible for their actions qua scientists involved in knowledge production, including for its outcomes, is largely inapplicable to cases of reactivity. Rather, scientists should not generally be held morally responsible for the outcomes brought about by reactivity of the scientific knowledge they produce. This position builds on the predictability of reactivity, and specifically on the often insurmountable difficulties involved in predicting agents’ reactions to predictions. I argue that, considering that a minimal level of predictability is required for attributing moral responsibility (Douglas, 2003, p. 61), and that it is very difficult to predict agents’ reactions to predictions, we sometimes cannot – and often should not – hold scientists morally responsible for the outcomes brought about by reactivity of the scientific knowledge they produce.
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DPhil Seminar Convenor: Oscar Monroy Perez
