Philosophy of Mind Seminar (Friday - Week 3, HT26)

Abstract: Perceptualists and Inferentialists offer opposing accounts of social cognition: do we directly perceive others’ mental states or infer them? Despite their disagreement, both camps assume an immutability thesis: while there might be superficial differences across contexts and individuals, core descriptions of social experience remain constant. Perceptual theorists tend to treat these descriptions as authoritative guides to social cognition, while inferentialists regard them as systematically misleading. 

This paper challenges that assumption. I argue that phenomenological description is not immutable but is modulated by what we know. While our social experiences may remain broadly similar, how we describe and interpret them can change as our conceptual and scientific understanding develops. To support this claim, I draw an analogy with work on intuitive physics, where increased knowledge reshapes how ordinary physical phenomena are described. Recognising the variability of phenomenological description helps reframe debates in social cognition and clarifies the role phenomenology should play in theorising about other minds.

The format for this week is pre-read. For a copy of the paper, please email matthew.parrott@st-hildas.ox.ac.uk