Metaphysics and Epistemology Group (Tuesday - Week 8, TT26)

Abstract: 

Sentences appearing to affirm that there are things we say, think and believe—such as (1) and (2) which occur in Middlemarch—are frequent in ordinary life.

(1)        Mr. Bulstrode, like other men, believes scores of things that are not true […].

(2)        Many things are true which only the commonest minds observe.

This suggests that ordinary speakers affirm the existence of propositions, things believed or said which are the bearers of truth and falsity.  However, there are a host of arguments purporting to show that expressions such as 'scores of things’ in (1) or ‘many things’ in (2) are special: though they appear to, they do not affirm the existence of propositions. I will examine and reject four challenges to the claim that sentences such as (1) and (2) affirm the existence of propositions.

Registration: If you do not hold a university card, please contact the seminar convenor or admin@philosophy.ox.ac.uk at least two working days before a seminar to register your attendance.