Cara Addleman (Christ Church College): 'Reasons and Resentment: Why the Reactive Attitudes Don't Support Internal Reasons Theory'
Abstract: Can I have a reason to perform some action, even if no amount of reasoning would motivate me to so act? Externalists answer yes; internalists answer no. In the last decade or so, Kate Manne (2014) and Gerald Gaus (2010) have proposed a new rationale for internalism: namely, that internalism is supported by our practices involving the reactive attitudes. This is an important defence of internalism. But it has not yet been properly assessed. In this paper, I provide such an assessment, and conclude that the argument falls at the first hurdle.
This is because reactive attitudes-based arguments for internalism rely on a shared premise: that someone is liable to the reactive attitudes in response to his action only if he could, through reasoning, reach a motivation to act otherwise. This premise is false. Thus, internalists must look elsewhere for their motivating rationale; appealing to the reactive attitudes does not support internalism over externalism.
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