Andreas Mogensen

andreas mogensen
Area of Specialisation:


2019-present Senior Research Fellow and Assistant Director (Philosophy) Global Priorities Institute, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford
2015-2021 Associate Professor, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford 
2015 - 2019 Tutorial Fellow, Jesus College, University of Oxford
2010 - 2015 Fellow by Examination, All Souls College, University of Oxford



2010 - 2014 D.Phil in Philosophy, University of Oxford, Thesis title: “Evolutionary Debunking Arguments in Ethics” Supervisors: Krister Bykvist, John Hawthorne 
2012 Visiting Scholar, Department of Philosophy, Duke University 
2008 - 2010 B. Phil in Philosophy, University of Oxford
2005 - 2008 B.A. (Hons) in Philosophy, University of Cambridge
Forthcoming “Fine-tuning the Darwinian Dilemma” in Machuca, ed. Evolutionary debunking arguments in philosophy (Routledge)
Forthcoming “Evolution, utilitarianism, and normative uncertainty: the practical significance of debunking arguments” (with William MacAskill), Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy
Forthcoming “Against large number scepticism,” in McMahan, Campbell, Goodrich, and Ramakrishnan, eds. Ethics and existence: the legacy of Derek Parfit (OUP)
2021 “Moral demands and the far future,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
2021 “The Paralysis Argument” (with William MacAskill), Philosophers’ Imprint 21, 1-17.
2021 “Is identity illusory?” European Journal of Philosophy 29, 55-73.
2021 “Should you save the more useful? The effect of generality on moral judgments about rescue and indirect effects” (with Lucius Caviola and Stefan Schubert), Cognition 206, 1-15.
2021 “Maximal cluelessness,” The Philosophical Quarterly 71, 141-62.




My current research interests are primarily in normative and applied ethics, focusing on questions to do with the moral significance of the far future today. My previous publications have addressed topics in meta-ethics and moral epistemology, especially those associated with evolutionary debunking arguments.