T J Mawson: List of publications

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Why heaven doesn't make earth absolutely meaningless, just relatively

2020
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Journal article
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Religious Studies
Copyright © The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press. In this article, I seek charitably to develop an argument suggested by Thaddeus Metz. This is an argument against the view that it is consistent to hold that, while our lives may have some meaningfulness even if there is no heavenly afterlife awaiting us, if there is such an afterlife, they are even more meaningful, because heaven adds a potential infinity of meaningfulness. Having developed this argument on Metz's behalf, I criticize it. I conclude that - while throwing out a number of interesting ideas and possibilities along the way - no argument along Metz's lines can finally reach the conclusion aimed for.

Monotheism and the Meaning of Life

2019
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Book
Monotheism and the Meaning of Life explores the role of God, and the relationship to the question 'What is the meaning of life?' for adherents of the main monotheistic religions - Judaism, Christianity and Islam. Exploring the various senses of 'meaning' and 'life', Mawson argues that there are various questions implicit in the notion of the meaning of life and that the God of monotheistic religion is central to the correct answers to all of them.
Religion

Does anything we do matter forever?

2019
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Journal article
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Religious Studies
In this article, I consider the question of whether or not any action we perform matters forever. I distinguish two senses of mattering, which I call ‘relative’ and ‘non-relative’ mattering; and I argue that the answers one should give to the questions of whether or not anything we do matters forever in these senses depend on one's world-view. I thus consider the questions from an atheistic naturalistic world-view and from two variants of the theistic world-view. Finally, I argue that on any plausible variants of these world-views, we either are already in or will end up in a state where nothing we do matters forever in the non-relative sense. And I consider whether or not it matters now that this is where we are or will end up. I conclude that on atheistic naturalism and on one variant of theism, it doesn't non-relatively matter now and on another variant of theism it does non-relatively matter now. I conclude that, on both variants of theism, it relatively and non-relatively matters at the time it obtains.

The Divine Attributes

2018
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Book

God's possible roles in the meanings of life. Reply to metz

2018
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Journal article
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European Journal for Philosophy of Religion
FT

The Meaning of Life

2018
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Chapter
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The Encyclopedia of Philosophy of Religion

Doing natural theology consistently with theism and why one might stop trying

2017
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Journal article
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Religious Studies

Does God Matter?

2017
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Chapter

Divine Free Will

2016
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Chapter
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The Routledge Companion to Free Will

God and the Meanings of Life

2016
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Book

What God Could (and Couldn't) do to make life meaningful

2016
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Chapter
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God and Meaning: New Essays

Freedom and the Causal Order

2016
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Chapter
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Re-thinking Order After the Laws of Nature

Classical Theism has no implicatoins for the Debate between Libertarianism and Compatibilism

2016
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Chapter
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Free Will and Theism Connections, Contingencies, and Concerns

What is this thing called the Philosophy of Religion?

2015
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Chapter
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What is this Thing Called Philosophy?
There is great clarity and intellectual commitment in the writing – a fine resource for anyone new to philosophy. ... Both deep and lively, it introduces the main contemporary issues in the major areas of philosophy and will no doubt be of great ...
Philosophy

The Meaning of Life and God's Purpose for Us

2015
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Journal article
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Dialogue

The Cognitive Science of Religion and the Rationality of Classical Theism

2014
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Chapter
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The Roots of Religion

Benjamin C. Jantzen An Introduction to Design Arguments. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014). Pp. xvi+335. $29.99 (Pbk). ISBN 978 0 521 18303-1.

2014
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Journal article
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Religious Studies

God and Evidence: Problems for Theistic Philosophers. By ROB LOVERING.

2014
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Journal article
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The Journal of Theological Studies

God in the Age of Science? by Herman Philipse.

2014
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Journal article
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Mind

Safety and Knowledge in God

2014
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Journal article
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European Journal for Philosophy of Religion
<jats:p>In recent ‘secular’ Epistemology, much attention has been paid to formulating an ‘anti-luck’ or ‘safety’ condition; it is now widely held that such a condition is an essential part of any satisfactory post-Gettier reflection on the nature of knowledge. In this paper, I explain the safety condition as it has emerged and then explore some implications of and for it arising from considering the God issue. It looks at the outset as if safety might be ‘good news’ for a view characteristic of Reformed Epistemology, viz. the view that if Theism is true, many philosophically unsophisticated believers probably know that it’s true. A (tentatively-drawn) sub-conclusion of my paper though suggests that as safety does not by itself turn true belief into knowledge, the recent focus on it is not quite such good news for Reformed Epistemologists as they may have hoped: it’s not that safety provides a new route by which they can reach this sort of conclusion. But safety is still good news for their view at least in the sense that there is no reason arising from considering it to count these philosophically unsophisticated believers as not knowing that there’s a God. I conclude by reflecting that good news for Reformed Epistemology is perhaps bad news for the discipline of Philosophy of Religion more generally, as there’s a possible ‘reflection destroys knowledge’-implication to be drawn. Those who have been led to their religious beliefs in at least some philosophically unsophisticated ways seem to enjoy much safer religious beliefs than those who have been led to their religious beliefs by philosophical reflection, so the discipline as a whole will be adversely affected if safety is eventually accorded the role of a necessary condition for knowledge.</jats:p>

Praying for outcomes one knows would be bad

2013
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Journal article
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Religious Studies
<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title><jats:p>In this article, I consider what states of knowledge of the value of outcomes are consistent with a classical theist's praying to God that He bring about those outcomes. I proceed from a consideration of the cases which seem least problematic (the theist knows these outcomes to be ones which would be, at least after they've been prayed for, best or at least good), through a consideration of cases where the outcomes prayed for are ones the goodness and badness of which the theist is agnostic about, to consider finally praying for outcomes that the theist knows would be bad at the time he or she is praying for them. I conclude that even prayers of this last sort should, albeit only on rare occasions, be prayed.</jats:p>

Praying for outcomes one knows would be bad

2013
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Journal article
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Religious Studies

Recent Work on the Meaning of Life and Philosophy of Religion

2013
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Journal article
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Philosophy Compass

Is Whether or Not There’s a God Worth Thinking About?

2013
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Chapter
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Ethics and the Challenge of Secularism: Russian and Western Perspectives

Theological Determinism

2012
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Journal article
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Dialogue a Journal of Religion and Philosophy

On Determining How Important It Is Whether or Not There Is a God

2012
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Journal article
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European Journal for Philosophy of Religion
<jats:p>Can the issue of how important it is whether or not there is a God be decided prior to deciding whether or not there is a God? In this paper, I explore some difficulties that stand in the way of answering this question in the affirmative and some of the implications of these difficulties for that part of the Philosophy of Religion which concerns itself with assessing arguments for and against the existence of God, the implications for how its importance may best be defended within secular academe.</jats:p>

Substance Dualism

2011
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Journal article
Philosophy

The Errors of Atheism. By J. ANGELO CORLETT.

2011
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Journal article
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The Journal of Theological Studies

Charles Taliaferro & Chad Meister (eds) The Cambridge Companion to Christian Philosophical Theology. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). Pp. xiv+265. £50.00, $88.99 (Hbk). £17.99, $27.99 (Pbk). ISBN 9780521514330 (Hbk), 9780521730372 (Pbk).

2011
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Journal article
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Religious Studies

Free Will

2011
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Chapter
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Free Will
Philosophy

Free Will: A Guide to the Perplexed

2011
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Book
Philosophy

Explaining the Fine Tuning of the Universe to Us and the Fine Tuning of Us to the Universe

2011
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Journal article
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Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement

Substance Dualism

2011
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Chapter
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The Bloomsbury Compantion to Philosophy of Mind

Theodical Individualism

2011
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Journal article
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European Journal for Philosophy of Religion

Sources of Dissatisfaction with Answers to the Question of the Meaning of Life

2010
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Journal article
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European Journal for Philosophy of Religion

Praying to Stop Being an Atheist

2010
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Journal article
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International Journal for Philosophy of Religion

The Ethics of Believing in God

2010
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Journal article
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Think: Philosophy for Everyone

Mill's Argument against Religious Knowledge

2009
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Journal article
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Religious Studies: an international journal for the philosophy of religion and theology

Morality and Religion

2009
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Journal article
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Philosophy Compass

Knowledge of God * By ALVIN PLANTINGA AND MICHAEL TOOLEY *

2009
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Journal article
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Analysis

Nature Red in Tooth and Claw: Theism and the Problem of Animal Suffering, by Michael Murray.

2009
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Journal article
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Mind

Timothy O'Connor Theism and Ultimate Explanation: The Necessary Shape of Contingency. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008). Pp. xiii+177. £40.00 (Hbk). ISBN 9781405169691.

2009
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Journal article
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Religious Studies

Why is there anything at all?

2009
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Chapter
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New Waves in Philosophy of Religion
Philosophy

Divine eternity

2008
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Journal article
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International Journal for Philosophy of Religion
I argue that Open Theism leads to a retreat from ascribing to God 'complete omniscience'. Having surrendered this ground, the Open Theist cannot but retreat from ascribing to God complete omnipotence; the Open Theist must admit that God might perform actions which He reasonably expected would meet certain descriptions but which nevertheless do not do so. This then makes whatever goodness (in the sense of beneficence, not just benevolence) God has a matter of luck. Open Theism is committed to a partially ignorant God, one who is subject to the vagaries of luck for the efficacy of at least some of His actions and for His goodness. © 2008 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.

The Euthyphro Dilemma

2008
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Journal article
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Think: Philosophy for Everyone

The Rational Inescapability of Value Objectivism

2008
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Journal article
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Think: Philosophy for Everyone

Praying for Known Outcomes

2007
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Journal article
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Religious Studies: an international journal for the philosophy of religion and theology

Harriet A. Harris and Christopher J. Insole (eds) Faith and Philosophical Analysis: The Impact of Analytical Philosophy on the Philosophy of Religion (Ashgate, 2005). Pp. vii+201. £50.00 (Hbk), £16.99 (Pbk). ISBN 0 7546 ...

2006
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Journal article
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Religious Studies

God's body

2006
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Journal article
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Heythrop Journal - Quarterly Review of Philosophy and Theology
On Classical Theism, God is ontologically distinct from the physical universe which He has created; He needn't have created any universe at all; and He could exist even if the universe didn't. By contrast, the universe couldn't have existed if God didn't and it needs God to sustain it in existence from moment to moment. Classical Theism is thus committed to the universe not being identical to God. I shall argue that Classical Theism is committed to seeing the universe as God's body (or a part of His body if there are parallel universes). It follows that it is also committed to the falsity of theories which identify people with their bodies or state that of necessity people depend on their bodies for their continued existence. © The author 2006.

‘Byrne’s’ religious pluralism

2005
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Journal article
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International Journal for Philosophy of Religion

Creation out of Nothing, A Biblical, Philosophical, and Scientific Exploration By Paul Copan and William Lane Craig. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2004, 277pp.

2005
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Journal article
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Philosophy
<jats:p />

How can I know I’ve perceived God?

2005
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Journal article
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International Journal for Philosophy of Religion

Freedom, human and divine

2005
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Journal article
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Religious Studies
<jats:p>In this paper I seek to show how God's freedom is not reduced or His power diminished by His inability to be less than perfectly good even though ours would be. That ours would be explains why it might prima facie appear to us that there is a ‘conceptual tension’ between some of the claims of traditional theism and reveals some interesting (well, to me anyway) differences between human freedom and divine freedom.</jats:p>

Belief in God An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion

2005
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Book
For example: If you&#39;re reading this book, then there is a God. You are reading this book. Therefore, there is a God. If there&#39;s a God, then whether or not you&#39;re reading this book there&#39;s a God, so it&#39;s certainly true that if you&#39;re reading this book,&nbsp;...
Philosophy

Morpheus and Berkeley on Reality

2005
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Chapter
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Philosophers Explore the Matrix

Religions, truth, and the pursuit of truth: a reply to Zamulinski

2004
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Journal article
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Religious Studies
<jats:p>This paper provides a comment on Brian Zamulinksi's article in <jats:italic>Religious Studies</jats:italic>, 39 (2003), 43–60. Contrary to Zamulinski's claim that religions are not truth-oriented but function as fictions, it is contended that they could not serve the purpose he assigns them unless their adherents regarded them as true. Religions must therefore be truth-oriented. The substantive question is whether any of them are true, and Zamulinski's paper provides no new method for addressing this question.</jats:p>

The possibility of a free-will defence for the problem of natural evil

2004
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Journal article
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Religious Studies
<jats:p>In this paper, I consider various arguments to the effect that natural evils are necessary for there to be created agents with free will of the sort that the traditional free-will defence for the problem of moral evil suggests we enjoy – arguments based on the idea that evil-doing requires the doer to use natural means in their agency. I conclude that, despite prima facie plausibility, these arguments do not, in fact, work. I provide my own argument for there being no possible world in which creatures enjoying this sort of freedom exist yet suffer no natural evil, and conclude that the way is thus open for extending the free-will defence to the problem of natural evil.</jats:p>

Jamie Mayerfeld Suffering and Moral Responsibility. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). Pp. xiii+237. £16.99 (Pbk). ISBN 0 19 515495 9.

2003
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Journal article
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Religious Studies

How a single personal revelation might not be a source of knowledge

2003
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Journal article
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Religious Studies
<jats:p>Many of those who come to a belief in the God of classical theism do so solely as a result of having had an experience which they believe it is reasonable for them to interpret as a revelation of His existence directly and graciously given to them by God Himself. I shall argue that – at least in the first instance – such people should probably not think of themselves as knowing that there is a God if they are also traditional libertarians and believe in Robert Nozick's theory of knowledge.</jats:p>

God's creation of morality

2002
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Journal article
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Religious Studies
In this paper, I argue that classical theists should think of God as having created morality. In form, my position largely resembles that defended by Richard Swinburne. However, it differs from his position in content in that it evacuates the category of necessary moral truth of all substance and, having effected this tactical withdrawal, Swinburne's battle lines need to be redrawn. In the first section, I introduce the Euthyphro dilemma. In the second, I argue that if necessary moral truths are seen as analytically/logically so, then, pace Swinburne, they cannot be regarded as substantive principles. Thus, seeing necessary moral truths as analytically/logically necessary and independent of God does not threaten God's power or sovereignty and leaves open the possibility that all value is contingent upon His will. In the third section, I turn to consider how the claim that all value is contingent upon God's will might best be understood, arguing that classical theists will want to commit themselves to a relatively strong form of objectivism about moral value (even though this is not needed in order to solve the Euthyphro dilemma). I then give and defend an account of God's creation of contingent moral truths which coheres with what I argue is the most plausible form of this commitment. In the following section, I argue that this account avoids the charge that God is arbitrary in His choice of values and, finally, I argue that it avoids the charge that God may not be said to be good without vacuity. Thus, I conclude that the Euthyphro dilemma does not threaten classical theism. © 2002 Cambridge University Press.

Omnipotence and necessary moral perfection are compatible: A reply to Morriston

2002
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Journal article
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Religious Studies
In this paper, which is a reply to Wes Morriston's 'Omnipotence and necessary moral perfection: are they compatible?', I argue that, contrary to what Morriston suggests, a classical theist need not admit that omnipotence and necessary moral perfection are incompatible. Indeed, I shall argue that a classical theist can show that an omnipotent being is of necessity morally perfect. © 2002 Cambridge University Press.

Mill's proof

2002
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Journal article
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PHILOSOPHY

ETERNAL TRUTHS AND CARTESIAN CIRCULARITY

2001
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Journal article
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British Journal for the History of Philosophy

Miracles and laws of nature

2001
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Journal article
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Religious Studies
In this paper, I argue that miracles should not be defined as involving violations of natural laws. They should be defined as signs of particular volitions of the deity or of other supernatural agents. I suggest that one may, without any prior belief in the existence of such supernatural agents, reasonably come to believe that one has witnessed miracles. © 2001 Cambridge University Press.

The problem of evil and moral indifference

1999
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Journal article
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Religious Studies
<jats:p>In this paper, I argue that if the libertarian free will defence were seen to fail because determinism were seen to be true, then another solution to the problem of evil would present itself. I start by arguing that one cannot, by consideration of agents' choices between morally indifferent options, reach any conclusion as to these agents' moral qualities. If certain forms of consequentialism were false, determinism true, and if there were a God who chose to create this universe, then His choice would have been between such options. Consideration of the general nature of the universe God putatively chose to create would not then license any conclusion as His moral qualities.</jats:p>

Classical Theism has No Implications for the Debate Between Libertarianism and Compatibilism

Chapter
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Free Will and Theism

God and Phenomenal Consciousness

Journal article
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Faith and Philosophy

The Case Against Atheism

Chapter
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The Oxford Handbook of Atheism

The Cognitive Science of Religion and the Rationality of Classical Theism

Chapter
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Science and Religion (TBC)

The Meaning of Theism

Journal article
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Faith and Philosophy

The Rationality of Classical Theism and Its Demographics

Chapter
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Scientific Approaches to the Philosophy of Religion

What has God to do with meaning?

Journal article
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Logoi