In a recent paper in this journal, Simon Hewitt has argued that theistic practice, at least within Christianity, does not support the claim that theists are committed to conceptualising God as a personal being. In this paper, by considering theistic worship, prayer, and understanding of scriptural revelation, I argue that at least these central theistic practices do imply such a conceptualisation.
In this paper, I elaborate a broadly Zagzebskian case for divine omnisubjectivity understood along the lines of her Empathy Model, defend it against an objection, and consider some implications of it.
AGATHEOS – European Journal for Philosophy of Religion
<jats:p>In this paper, I argue that if any one of Judaism, Christianity or Islam is true, then the adherents of each worship the same God as one another. The issue is primarily one of reference and on any plausible account of how “God” and what I call “cognate names” of God work, all refer to God if any refers to God. Thus, anyone who directs worship to what they suppose they refer with these names directs worship to God if there is a God. There is (perhaps surprising) scope for those with radically misguided views of the nature of God to nevertheless refer to Him and to worship Him should He exist.</jats:p>
5004 Religious Studies, 50 Philosophy and Religious Studies, 5003 Philosophy, 5005 Theology
On the prudence of adopting a ‘sin now; repent later’ policy
January 2023
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Journal article
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Religious Studies
‘Listen, I'm against sin. I'll kick it as long as I've got a foot; I'll punch it as long as I've got a fist; I'll butt it as long as I've got a head; and I'll bite it as long as I've got a tooth’ (Billy Sunday). Billy Sunday was a revivalist preacher in the early half of the twentieth century. I take it that Billy's approach to sin will be taken by most to be more theologically acceptable than the following. ‘I figure I'll go for the life of sin, followed by the presto-change-o deathbed repentance’ (Bart Simpson). Bart Simpson is a character in the animated TV Show, The Simpsons. In the vignette from which this quotation of Bart's is abstracted, Bart is actually in conversation with a Billy-Sunday-like preacher. The preacher, on hearing of Bart's theology (Bartian theology, we may call it; not, NB Barthian theology), replies in a slightly stunned way, as if he had never himself considered Bartianism prior to that particular moment, ‘Wow! That is a good angle. . .’ However, he quickly collects himself and adds definitively, ‘But it's not God's angle.’ In this article, I wish to explore Bart's angle; could it, or something like it, after all, be a prudent angle?
Belief in God: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion
January 2023
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Book
I start with a—roughly speaking, psychological—claim that I venture is true of everyone reading this book. At some stage in your life, the physical world considered as a whole—the planet on which you live; the stars you see in the sky: the whole lot—has presented itself to your intellect as something close to a question.
Why might God create?
May 2022
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Journal article
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Religious Studies
Some have held that this question cannot be given a satisfactory answer within the constraints
imposed by a traditional theistic framework, a framework which sees the universe as contingent on God’s
free choice to create it. However, I shall argue that, whilst traditional theism certainly does place constraints
on possible answers to the title question, on assumptions which are themselves plausible, these constraints
leave open various possibilities for understanding the reasons God may have had as He decided whether or
not to create something other than Himself.
It's possible there's a God
April 2022
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Journal article
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Expository Times
Based on: Swinburne Richard, The Coherence of Theism, 2nd ed. (Oxford: OUP, 2016. £24.99. pp. vii + 308. ISBN: 978-0-19-877970-4).
Theism and meaning in life
April 2022
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Chapter
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The Oxford Handbook of Meaning in Life
This chapter examines meaningfulness in life as significance. It argues that there are two sorts of significance, subjective significance and objective significance. Subjective significance is a matter of how much something is cared about, and objective significance is a matter of how objectively valuable something is relative to suitable comparators. Given these understandings and in critical conversation with the work of Williams and Kahane, the chapter draws out the assumptions on which human lives may be argued to be more significant in both these senses if there’s a God than if there’s not, and endorses these assumptions (in one case, somewhat tentatively), arguing indeed that, on them, one may say that individuals’ lives have infinite significance in both senses if there is a God and only finite significance in both senses if there is not.
What has God to do with meaning? God has a lot to do with meaning
March 2022
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Journal article
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λogoi
The meaning of life
October 2021
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Chapter
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The Encyclopedia of Philosophy of Religion
The question, “What is the meaning of life?” is a question that most lay-people would think must form a chief focus of the work of those who style themselves professional philosophers. But, until relatively recently, hardly anybody who called themselves a professional philosopher had worked on the question “What is the meaning of life?” at all. Why was that? And why did it change? Because it has changed. How is the question “What is the meaning of life?” now understood? Of what relevance, if any, is it to the Philosophy of Religion and of what relevance, if any, is the Philosophy of Religion to it? The author of this piece charts the emerging respectability of the question, “What is the meaning of life?” within Analytic Philosophy and its interactions with the Philosophy of Religion and with Religions. He ventures some predictions about where “What is the meaning of life?” will go in the next stage of its history.
If one believes in God, what should one say is the answer to the question of why we are here? In this article, I hope to show that when we ask why we are here we ask several different questions at once and that Theism allows (indeed dictates) that these different questions have very different answers. Appreciating these differences can remove at least that perplexity generated when an answer which could well be plausible were it to be given in response to one question of God's purpose for us is mislocated and treated as if it were an answer to another.
Why heaven doesn't make earth absolutely meaningless, just relatively
March 2020
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Journal article
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Religious Studies
In this article, I seek charitably to develop an argument suggested by Thaddeus Metz. This is an argument against the view that it is consistent to hold that, while our lives may have some meaningfulness even if there is no heavenly afterlife awaiting us, if there is such an afterlife, they are even more meaningful, because heaven adds a potential infinity of meaningfulness. Having developed this argument on Metz's behalf, I criticize it. I conclude that – while throwing out a number of interesting ideas and possibilities along the way – no argument along Metz's lines can finally reach the conclusion aimed for.
Monotheism and the Meaning of Life
August 2019
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Book
Monotheism and the Meaning of Life explores the role of God, and the relationship to the question 'What is the meaning of life?' for adherents of the main monotheistic religions - Judaism, Christianity and Islam. Exploring the various senses of 'meaning' and 'life', Mawson argues that there are various questions implicit in the notion of the meaning of life and that the God of monotheistic religion is central to the correct answers to all of them.
Religion
Does anything we do matter forever?
March 2019
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Journal article
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Religious Studies
In this article, I consider the question of whether or not any action we perform matters forever. I distinguish two senses of mattering, which I call ‘relative’ and ‘non-relative’ mattering; and I argue that the answers one should give to the questions of whether or not anything we do matters forever in these senses depend on one's world-view. I thus consider the questions from an atheistic naturalistic world-view and from two variants of the theistic world-view. Finally, I argue that on any plausible variants of these world-views, we either are already in or will end up in a state where nothing we do matters forever in the non-relative sense. And I consider whether or not it matters now that this is where we are or will end up. I conclude that on atheistic naturalism and on one variant of theism, it doesn't non-relatively matter now and on another variant of theism it does non-relatively matter now. I conclude that, on both variants of theism, it relatively and non-relatively matters at the time it obtains.
The Divine Attributes
November 2018
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Book
5003 Philosophy, 5004 Religious Studies, 5005 Theology, 50 Philosophy and Religious Studies
God's possible roles in the meanings of life. Reply to metz
September 2018
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Journal article
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European Journal for Philosophy of Religion
FT
An agreeable answer to a pro-theism/anti-theism question
December 2017
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Chapter
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Does God Matter?
In this chapter, I address some difficulties that stand in the way of reaching an answer that will be agreeable across the Theist/Atheist divide to a particular Pro-theism/Anti-theism question, the question I call ‘the’ comparative Pro-theism/Anti-theism question. Really, one might say, ‘the’ comparative Pro-theism/Anti-theism question is two questions, one for the theist and one for the atheist. For the theist: would God’s not existing have been better or worse than is His existing? For the atheist: would God’s existing have been better or worse than is His not existing? Assuming that theist and atheist alike should agree that the issue of whether or not there’s a God concerns a metaphysical necessity and thus that each should think of themselves as involved in counter-possible reasoning when addressing their variant of ‘the’ comparative Pro-theism/Anti-theism question, I shall argue that the difficulties they face in reaching an agreement on its answer, whilst not insignificant, can be overcome, at least to an extent. I shall tentatively suggest that an answer that I shall call ‘Weak Pro-Theism’ emerges as one that is agreeable across the Theist/Atheist divide, agreeable as what I shall call the ‘lower epistemic bound’ to ‘the’ correct answer to ‘the’ comparative question. More specifically, the theist should answer his variant of the question by saying that it would have been somewhat worse (or at least no better) were God not to have existed. The atheist should answer his variant by saying that it would have been somewhat better (or at least no worse) were God to have existed. I shall argue that arguments for a stronger Pro-theistic conclusion to this question largely wait on a resolution to the Theism/Atheism question.
Doing natural theology consistently with theism and why one might stop trying
September 2017
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Journal article
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Religious Studies
Introduction
September 2017
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Journal article
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Religious Studies
5003 Philosophy, 5004 Religious Studies, 50 Philosophy and Religious Studies
Divine free will
November 2016
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Chapter
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The Routledge Companion to Free Will
Classical Theism has no implicatoins for the Debate between Libertarianism and Compatibilism
May 2016
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Chapter
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Free Will and Theism Connections, Contingencies, and Concerns
Freedom and the Causal Order
January 2016
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Chapter
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Rethinking Order: After the Laws of Nature
GOD AND THE MEANINGS OF LIFE: WHAT GOD COULD AND COULDN’T DO TO MAKE OUR LIVES MORE MEANINGFUL
January 2016
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Book
Some philosophers have thought that life could only be meaningful if there is no God. For Sartre and Nagel, for example, a God of the traditional classical theistic sort would constrain our powers of self-creative autonomy in ways that would severely detract from the meaning of our lives, possibly even evacuate our lives of all meaning. Some philosophers, by contrast, have thought that life could only be meaningful if there is a God. God and the Meanings of Life is interested in exploring the truth in both these schools of thought, seeking to discover what God could and couldn't do to make life meaningful (as well as what he would and wouldn't do). Mawson espouses a version of the 'amalgam' or 'pluralism' thesis about the issue of life's meaning – in essence, that there are a number of different legitimate meanings of 'meaning' (and indeed 'life') in the question of life's meaning. According to Mawson, God, were he to exist, would help make life meaningful in some of these senses and hinder in some others. He argues that whilst there could be meaning in a Godless universe, there could be other sorts of meaning in a Godly one and that these would be deeper.
What God Could (and Couldn’t) Do to Make Life Meaningful
January 2016
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Chapter
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God and Meaning: New Essays
What is this thing called the Philosophy of Religion?
December 2015
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Chapter
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What is this Thing Called Philosophy?
There is great clarity and intellectual commitment in the writing – a fine resource
for anyone new to philosophy. ... Both deep and lively, it introduces the main
contemporary issues in the major areas of philosophy and will no doubt be of
great ...
Philosophy
The Meaning of Life and God's Purpose for Us
April 2015
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Journal article
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Dialogue
Philosophy of religion
January 2015
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Book
Substance Dualism
January 2015
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Chapter
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The Bloomsbury Companion to Philosophy of Mind
The Cognitive Science of Religion and the Rationality of Classical Theism
December 2014
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Chapter
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The Roots of Religion
Benjamin C. Jantzen An Introduction to Design Arguments. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014). Pp. xvi+335. $29.99 (Pbk). ISBN 978 0 521 18303-1.
December 2014
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Journal article
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Religious Studies
5003 Philosophy, 5004 Religious Studies, 50 Philosophy and Religious Studies
God and Evidence: Problems for Theistic Philosophers. By Rob Lovering.
October 2014
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Journal article
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The Journal of Theological Studies
God in the Age of Science? by Herman Philipse.
July 2014
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Journal article
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Mind
5003 Philosophy, 50 Philosophy and Religious Studies
Safety and Knowledge in God
January 2014
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Journal article
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European Journal for Philosophy of Religion
5003 Philosophy, 5004 Religious Studies, 50 Philosophy and Religious Studies
The Cognitive Science of Religion and the Rationality of Classical Theism
January 2014
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Chapter
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Science and Religion (TBC)
Praying for outcomes one knows would be bad
December 2013
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Journal article
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Religious Studies
Praying for outcomes one knows would be bad
December 2013
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Journal article
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Religious Studies
AbstractIn this article, I consider what states of knowledge of the value of outcomes are consistent with a classical theist's praying to God that He bring about those outcomes. I proceed from a consideration of the cases which seem least problematic (the theist knows these outcomes to be ones which would be, at least after they've been prayed for, best or at least good), through a consideration of cases where the outcomes prayed for are ones the goodness and badness of which the theist is agnostic about, to consider finally praying for outcomes that the theist knows would be bad at the time he or she is praying for them. I conclude that even prayers of this last sort should, albeit only on rare occasions, be prayed.
Recent Work on the Meaning of Life and Philosophy of Religion
December 2013
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Journal article
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Philosophy Compass
5004 Religious Studies, 50 Philosophy and Religious Studies
Is Whether or Not There’s a God Worth Thinking About?
May 2013
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Chapter
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Ethics and the Challenge of Secularism: Russian and Western Perspectives
Theological Determinism
April 2012
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Journal article
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Dialogue a Journal of Religion and Philosophy
On Determining How Important It Is Whether or Not There Is a God
January 2012
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Journal article
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European Journal for Philosophy of Religion
5004 Religious Studies, 5005 Theology, 50 Philosophy and Religious Studies
The Rationality of Classical Theism and Its Demographics
January 2012
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Chapter
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Scientific Approaches to the Philosophy of Religion
Substance Dualism
April 2011
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Journal article
Philosophy
The Errors of Atheism. By J. Angelo Corlett.
April 2011
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Journal article
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The Journal of Theological Studies
43 History, Heritage and Archaeology, 4303 Historical Studies, 50 Philosophy and Religious Studies, 5004 Religious Studies, 5005 Theology
Charles Taliaferro & Chad Meister (eds) The Cambridge Companion to Christian Philosophical Theology. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). Pp. xiv+265. £50.00, $88.99 (Hbk). £17.99, $27.99 (Pbk). ISBN 9780521514330 (Hbk), 9780521730372 (Pbk).
March 2011
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Journal article
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Religious Studies
5005 Theology, 50 Philosophy and Religious Studies
Free Will
January 2011
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Chapter
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Free Will
Philosophy
Free Will: A Guide to the Perplexed
January 2011
|
Book
Philosophy
Explaining the Fine Tuning of the Universe to Us and the Fine Tuning of Us to the Universe
January 2011
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Journal article
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Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement
Substance Dualism
January 2011
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Chapter
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The Continuum Companion to Philosophy of Mind
Theodical Individualism
January 2011
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Journal article
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European Journal for Philosophy of Religion
Sources of Dissatisfaction with Answers to the Question of the Meaning of Life
July 2010
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Journal article
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European Journal for Philosophy of Religion
Praying to Stop Being an Atheist
January 2010
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Journal article
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International Journal for Philosophy of Religion
The Ethics of Believing in God
January 2010
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Journal article
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Think: Philosophy for Everyone
Mill's Argument against Religious Knowledge
December 2009
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Journal article
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Religious Studies: an international journal for the philosophy of religion and theology
Morality and Religion
December 2009
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Journal article
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Philosophy Compass
Knowledge of GodBy Alvin Plantingaand Michael Tooley
July 2009
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Journal article
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Analysis
5003 Philosophy, 50 Philosophy and Religious Studies
Nature Red in Tooth and Claw: Theism and the Problem of Animal Suffering, by Michael Murray.
July 2009
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Journal article
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Mind
5003 Philosophy, 50 Philosophy and Religious Studies
Timothy O'Connor Theism and Ultimate Explanation: The Necessary Shape of Contingency. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008). Pp. xiii+177. £40.00 (Hbk). ISBN 9781405169691.
June 2009
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Journal article
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Religious Studies
5004 Religious Studies, 50 Philosophy and Religious Studies
Belief in God: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion
January 2008
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Book
The Euthyphro Dilemma
January 2008
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Journal article
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Think: Philosophy for Everyone
The Rational Inescapability of Value Objectivism
January 2008
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Journal article
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Think: Philosophy for Everyone
Letters to Doubting Thomas: A Case for the Existence of God
January 2007
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Journal article
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Ars Disputandi
5003 Philosophy, 5004 Religious Studies, 50 Philosophy and Religious Studies
Praying for Known Outcomes
January 2007
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Journal article
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Religious Studies: an international journal for the philosophy of religion and theology
Harriet A. Harris and Christopher J. Insole (eds) Faith and Philosophical Analysis: The Impact of Analytical Philosophy on the Philosophy of Religion (Ashgate, 2005). Pp. vii+201. £50.00 (Hbk), £16.99 (Pbk). ISBN 0 7546 ...
September 2006
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Journal article
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Religious Studies
5004 Religious Studies, 50 Philosophy and Religious Studies
Divine Motivation Theory
January 2006
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Journal article
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Ars Disputandi
5003 Philosophy, 5004 Religious Studies, 50 Philosophy and Religious Studies
God's body
January 2006
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Journal article
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Heythrop Journal - Quarterly Review of Philosophy and Theology
5003 Philosophy, 5004 Religious Studies, 50 Philosophy and Religious Studies
Creation out of Nothing, A Biblical, Philosophical, and Scientific Exploration By Paul Copan and William Lane Craig. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2004, 277pp. -
July 2005
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Journal article
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Philosophy
5005 Theology, 50 Philosophy and Religious Studies
How can I know I’ve perceived God?
April 2005
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Journal article
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International Journal for Philosophy of Religion
5003 Philosophy, 50 Philosophy and Religious Studies
Freedom, human and divine
March 2005
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Journal article
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Religious Studies
5003 Philosophy, 5004 Religious Studies, 50 Philosophy and Religious Studies
Morpheus and Berkeley on Reality
January 2005
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Chapter
|
Philosophers Explore the Matrix
Religions, truth, and the pursuit of truth: a reply to Zamulinski
September 2004
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Journal article
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Religious Studies
5004 Religious Studies, 50 Philosophy and Religious Studies
The possibility of a free-will defence for the problem of natural evil
March 2004
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Journal article
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Religious Studies
5003 Philosophy, 5004 Religious Studies, 50 Philosophy and Religious Studies
Jamie Mayerfeld Suffering and Moral Responsibility. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). Pp. xiii+237. £16.99 (Pbk). ISBN 0 19 515495 9.
December 2003
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Journal article
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Religious Studies
5003 Philosophy, 5004 Religious Studies, 50 Philosophy and Religious Studies
How a single personal revelation might not be a source of knowledge
September 2003
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Journal article
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Religious Studies
5004 Religious Studies, 50 Philosophy and Religious Studies
5004 Religious Studies, 5005 Theology, 50 Philosophy and Religious Studies
The problem of evil and moral indifference
September 1999
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Journal article
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Religious Studies
5003 Philosophy, 5004 Religious Studies, 50 Philosophy and Religious Studies
Am I here by accident?
Chapter
|
Theological Determinism
Choosing to pray for the past
Journal article
|
Agatheos: European Journal for Philosophy of Religion
Most of those who believe in the theistic God offer petitionary prayers to Him, supposing that,
whatever else they may be doing when they are doing so, they are increasing the chances that
reality will conform to their prayerfully expressed desires for it. On several clusters of views that
are popular with theists, praying that the past have been a certain way seems to make no less
sense than praying that the future will be a certain way, for God is atemporal and thus for Him
the time at which a prayer happens to be uttered relative to the outcome it concerns seems likely
to be an irrelevance. In this paper, I outline one reason why it is not an irrelevance and draw out
the implication for whether or not one can coherently consider oneself to be choosing to utter
efficacious prayers for the past.
Classical Theism has No Implications for the Debate Between Libertarianism and Compatibilism
Chapter
|
Free Will and Theism
God and Phenomenal Consciousness
Journal article
|
Faith and Philosophy
5003 Philosophy, 5004 Religious Studies, 5005 Theology, 50 Philosophy and Religious Studies
If any one of Judaism, Christianity or Islam is true, then a lot more people worship God than religious diversity might seem to suggest
Chapter
|
Arguing about Diversity: Philosophy of Religion in the Global Age
If any one of Judaism, Christianity or Islam is true, even if only in broad outline, then Jews, Christians and Muslims worship the same God as one another. In the cases of each of the three Abrahamic faiths, the avowed intention is to worship the same God as Abraham worshipped and each tradition supposes that it may trace itself back to him. Moses, a figure again revered by each tradition, is depicted in two of the traditions as having directly received the ancestor-name for the present-day English ‘God’ from God Himself. If one is a Kripkean about the name ‘God’, all this is about as good as it could get for the thesis that if they use the term ‘God’ in attempting to refer to the object of their religious devotion, then the adherents of each these religions refer by it to the same being as one another, presuming any refer by it. In short: if one of these religions manages to refer to God with ‘God’, they all do; if the followers of one of these religions worships God, the followers of all do. Through their interactions with Greek culture and with one another, each of these religious traditions has also come to share what is usually called the theistic concept of God. If one takes more of a descriptivist approach to ‘God’, then again this is about as good as it could get for the thesis that whether one is a Jew, Christian, or Muslim, if one directs one’s worship to a being one calls ‘God’, one is directing it towards the same being as the adherents of the other monotheistic religions, presuming the theistic concept of God is indeed instantiated. The bottom line is the same: if one of these religions manages to refer to God with ‘God’, they all do; if the followers of one worship God, the followers of all do.
Whilst matters are not as clear-cut as this suggests, I shall argue that this line of thinking is fundamentally sound; and I shall close by pushing it a bit farther along the road, towards the claim that if Theism is true, then all who believe in any supernatural being(s) at all are believing of God that He exists and worshipping Him, at least if He has not created anything else supernatural.
SBTMR
Meaning of Life
Journal article
5004 Religious Studies, 50 Philosophy and Religious Studies
Swinburne's a priori argument for social trinitarianism
Journal article
|
Journal of Analytic Theology
In this paper, I critically assess Richard Swinburne’s argument for the conceptual necessity of the claim that if there is one divine person, there are exactly three divine persons. I argue that his argument fails.
The Case Against Atheism
Chapter
|
The Oxford Handbook of Atheism
The Meaning of Theism
Journal article
|
Faith and Philosophy
5003 Philosophy, 5004 Religious Studies, 5005 Theology, 50 Philosophy and Religious Studies
'Richard Swinburne'
Chapter
|
Dictionary of Christian Apologetics
This is an overview of the work of Richard Swinburne as a Christian Apologist.
