Metaphysics and Epistemology Group (Tuesday - Week 2, TT26)

Abstract: Sometimes unexpected experiences force us to revise the way we look at the world, describe it, evaluate it, navigate it and apply concepts in it. Through such experiences, we can also acquire genuinely new concepts. In this talk I examine a form of moral learning driven by this kind of experience, arguing that the mechanisms involved are sufficient to explain the acquisition of genuinely new moral concepts without derivation from abstract principles. An important question is whether this learning is distinctively moral or merely descriptive. I argue that it is moral, drawing on recent work on characterizations and on the role of values in structuring how agents divide up the space of possibilities. I then consider how this account fares with respect to prominent theories of concept acquisition, and suggest that what agents acquire in the early stages of such learning is best understood as something that precedes full concept possession but is constitutively evaluative from the start. Finally, I argue that narrative and conversation can trigger the same learning mechanisms as direct experience.

Registration: If you do not hold a university card, please contact the seminar convenor or admin@philosophy.ox.ac.uk at least two working days before a seminar to register your attendance.