Ben Schmidt (Somerville College) : 'Defending the Maximality of Metaphysical Necessity'
Abstract: Recently, Clarke-Doane (2019) has argued against the thesis that metaphysical necessity is the maximal objective necessity, put forward by Williamson (2016). He has argued that, given the evidence on which we make objective possibility judgments, there are counterexamples to the thesis that metaphysical necessity is the maximal objective necessity. In this essay, it is argued that Clarke-Doane’s argument fails. It fails because its crucial premise is ambiguous: ‘evidence’ either means conclusive or inconclusive evidence. It is argued that on the first reading, the premise is false because the evidence is sensitive to guise, which objective possibility is not, and that on the second reading, the premise fails to yield dialectically effective counterexamples to the thesis that metaphysical necessity is the maximal objective necessity, because the defender of this thesis can adopt a principled error-theory about these judgments due to their guise-sensitivity. The essay also provides a response to an objection from substantivity which can be levelled on the second horn of the dilemma, alleging that the maximal objective necessity would be metaphysically insubstantial, by pointing out that many natural sciences employ objective necessities, and any maximal objective necessity is therefore prima facie of theoretical value to all sciences.
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Ockham Society Convenors: Jack Tristani, Yuxin Tang and Meredith Ross-James | Ockham Society Webpage
