Andrej Jovićević (Merton College): 'Explanation is Question-Sensitive'
Abstract: I defend the thesis that explanation is question-sensitive. The argument is as follows. Explanation is a pre-theoretic notion, so an adequate theory vindicates (most) pre-theoretic judgments of adequacy about sentences citing reasons why something is the case (e-ascriptions). Since such judgments are themselves question-sensitive, an adequate theory predicts the question-sensitivity of explanation. But then the relation of explanatory dependence itself is question-sensitive. I motivate the claims that (i) explanation is a pre-theoretic notion and (ii) that adequate theories of pre-theoretic notions vindicate (most) pre-theoretic judgments. I also argue that pre-theoretic judgments about explanatory adequacy are sensitive to why-questions. The central example, which straightforwardly generalises and is hence robust, shows that, relative to different questions expressed by one why-interrogative (modulo stress patterns), the same e-ascription may be judged both true and false. After addressing objections, I argue that this conclusion challenges the view that explanatory dependence is entirely ontological or worldly.
