Joshua Loo (Somerville College): 'Self-knowledge in Hume's Treatise and Malebranche's Recherche'
Abstract: Hume and his interpreters have often acknowledged his debt to Malebranche. Their views on self-knowledge, however, have elicited exegetical controversy. In the Treatise of Human Nature and Recherche de la vérité respectively, each seeks to show restrictions on some forms of self-knowledge. But do they propound 'identical doctrines' (Doxsee) or 'entirely different' arguments (McCracken)?
'On my proposed construction, their views on self-knowledge are a point of agreement between general epistemological views in broader conflict. First, they share certain individual arguments that we have no clear idea of the soul. Second, they make similar assumptions about what a clear idea of the soul would amount to. Third, each instead regards self-knowledge as experimental. Fourth, the differences between their views of self-knowledge do not simply follow from their broader disagreements but are partly generated by considerations internal to the views they share'.
