The Ockham Society (Thursday - Week 7, TT26)

Abstract: Moore’s hands argument has had wide-ranging impact in philosophy. Recently, it has been of interest to metaethics as a counterargument to the Error Theory (Huemer 2005; Sampson 2023) and in epistemology, it is taken to be a central part of advocating for common-sense views (Kelly, 2005; 2008). This, however, is not without controversy. Indeed, common sense might well be overturned by philosophical argument, as Rinard (2013) argues. While I do not adjudicate these debates, they inform my analysis of Moorean argument when it encounters weak defeaters. I begin by covering the distinction between undercutting and rebutting defeaters. I go on to introduce a general principle about Moorean argument and evidence. Next, I introduce an informal case to show that weak undercutting defeat looks more effective against Moorean argument. To strengthen my case, I also discuss a more formally modelled case. I then draw some lessons from these cases about the ways weak rebuttal and weak undercutting work, ultimately to argue a weak undercutter is more successful against a Moorean argument than a weak rebutter.

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