Abstract: This talk argues for aesthetic cognitivism, the view that aesthetic statements are truth-apt and express beliefs. I first present the linguistic evidence in favour of cognitivism. I then argue that our aesthetic judgements resemble beliefs more than they resemble non-cognitive states. Finally, I discuss some phenomena relating to aesthetic judgement which are sometimes thought to support non-cognitivism—the ‘Acquaintance Principle’, the ‘autonomy’ of aesthetic judgement, and the impossibility of acquiring aesthetic knowledge via testimony—and argue that cognitivists can explain these phenomena.
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Ockham Society Convenors: Jack Tristani, Yuxin Tang and Meredith Ross-James | Ockham Society Webpage
