Benedict Blunt (Hertford College): 'Kant on Cognising the Moral Law'
Abstract: I argue that Kant ought not be taken for a moral realist. After reconstructing the debate into which I am intervening, I will show that although realism is, in the first instance, a metaphysical thesis concerning the grounds of moral principles, it turns out to enforce commitments concerning the nature of the capacity exercised in their cognition. Specifically, it enforces a view concerning the relation practical thought bears to the good that assimilates it to that borne by theoretical cognition to the true. But Kant explicitly rejects such an assimilation. Kant claims that theoretical cognition is responsive to the true, whereas practical cognition is productive of the good; he denies the words a realist must put in his mouth. And this is for good reason, for I also show that Kant premises his claim that pure reason can yield knowledge in its practical employment upon his rejection of such a conflation. This gives us good reason to reject the possibility of faithfully reconstructing Kant as a realist.
Ockham Society Convenors: Jack Tristani, Yuxin Tang and Meredith Ross-James | Ockham Society Webpage
