The Ockham Society (Wednesday - Week 4, MT20)
A number of philosophers in recent years have argued that ethical motivation arises from a perception of the moral sense of a situation. In such a case, to say that X perceives y to be morally good is no different from saying that X perceives z to be delicious. But when we say that “that croissant looks delicious,” are we not speaking metaphorically? And if that is true, then to say that some action looks wrong seems as though it must be metaphorical as well. I will argue, using the work of Susannah Siegel, that perception is able to represent such properties as “deliciousness,” and that, therefore, perception is able to represent moral properties as well. Virtues, then, are what I will call dispositions of moral sense, such that, to have a virtue is to be able to recognize certain properties as motivations to act.
Additional Information: Ockham will be held on MS Teams during MT20. Please email email@example.com if you wish to attend.
Ockham Society Convenor: Steven Diggin | Ockham Society Webpage