The Ockham Society

Abstract: Aristotle responds to the scientific and relativist theories of his day by theorising a subtle model of perceptual realism. Colour can be understood as the power to be seen in a given way, which is only fully activated in appropriate external conditions and in the presence of a suitable perceiver. Despite this seeming dependency, colour is objective and existing independently in the world. I argue that Aristotle recognises two modes of being colour: (A) an intrinsic property of an object, and (B) a visual experience in the perceiver. He seems to identify the two: both are colour. However, they are not the same and there is a problematic relationship between them. 

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Ockham Society Convenors: Max Festenstein, Leo Sonntag, Marta Szatkowska, and Joseph Karaganis | Ockham Society Webpage