Philosophy of Mathematics Seminar

Abstract: There are many attempts to nominalize mathematical language, and other parts of language that appear to commit speakers to the existence of abstract entities. Some, like Hartry Field's (1980), rely on honest toil; others, like Joseph Melia's (1995, 2000), appear to resort to theft. Instrumental nominalism sits somewhere in between. Mark Balaguer (1998) states it without much detail; Gideon Rosen (2001) gives a more precise version, which reveals certain commitments the nominalist will typically reject; I tried to remove those (2012), but I quickly became dissatisfied with the attempt. Fifteen years later, in this talk, I'll try to do better, while exploring exactly what the goal of this version of nominalism is.

Registration: If you do not hold a University card which gives access to the upper floors of the Schwarzman Centre, please write to admin@philosophy.ox.ac.uk copied to daniel.isaacson@philosophy.ox.ac.uk at least two working days before a seminar to register your attendance.  

Please note: A notice will be sent out for each talk with the Zoom link.

_{Philosophy of Mathematics Seminar Convenors: Daniel Isaacson and Beau Mount}