Post-Kantian European Philosophy Seminar

Abstract: Many philosophers, notably Joseph Raz, have held that the notion of normativity is essentially connected to that of rationality, conceived as the capacity to recognize reasons. As Raz puts it, “[t]he normativity of all that is normative consists in the way that it is, or provides, or is otherwise related to reasons” (“Explaining Normativity” (1999), p. 67). I argue against this view by appealing to the idea of  “primitive normativity”: a form of normativity associated, not with rationality, but with what Kant, in the third Critique, calls the faculty of judgment.  The recognition of primitive normativity is required for grasping linguistic meaning and concepts, and hence it is a prior condition of, rather than depending on, the recognition of reasons.  I go on to consider the relevance of primitive normativity to questions, often considered under the head of judicial discretion, about about how judges decide “hard cases.” I suggest that these decisions are governed by normative constraints, but that, rather than being constraints of rationality,  these are constraints of the more primitive kind associated with judgment. 

Registration: If you do not hold a university card, please contact the seminar convenor or admin@philosophy.ox.ac.uk at least two working days before a seminar to register your attendance.

Post-Kantian European Philosophy Seminar Convenors: Jack Wearing, Manuel Dries, Joseph Schear, Kate Kirkpatrick and Mark Wrathall.