Workshop in Ancient Philosophy

Chair: Martina Buston

At Outlines of Pyrrhonism (PH) 1.13 Sextus Empiricus distinguishes two understandings of ‘belief’ (dogma) and claims that it is only on one of them that the Pyrrhonian sceptic has no beliefs: on the other, wider one, it turns out, they do have beliefs. The exact nature of the sceptic’s beliefs is unclear, and open to debate. For instance, does the sceptic believe that the world is in such and such a way, or rather that it appears to them in such and such a way? Do the sceptic’s beliefs deserve to be called ‘beliefs’ at all? Are they truly compatible with the sceptic’s suspending judgement on everything? In this talk, I try to provide a fresh perspective on this set of questions by piecing together the story and the philosophical motivations which lie behind Sextus’ distinction at PH 1.13. First, I lay out some general features of Sextus’ account of sceptical philosophy in PH 1. Then, I trace the development of this distinction in the Pyrrhonist tradition between Aenesidemus and Sextus. Finally, I examine the way Sextus employs this distinction in PH and flesh out some implications which this might have for our interpretation of the sceptic’s beliefs. 

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If you would like to go out to dinner with the speaker, then please contact the chair of the meeting before the Tuesday preceding the talk. The meals of the chair and the speaker are covered by the faculty; others attend at their own expense.

_{Workshop in Ancient Philosophy Convenors: Alexander Bown (MT), Marion Durand (HT), Ursula Coope (TT).}