Lucas Janz (Corpus Christi): 'How to Speak about Being'
Abstract: Recently, many interpreters have argued that Heidegger’s commitments to the inconsistent triad that (a) assertions about Being are possible, (b) Being is not an entity and (c) assertions can only be about entities show, that he cannot consistently make assertions about Being. I argue that this does not follow the apparent trilemma involves an equivocation. While all assertions must be ‘about’ entities as their subjects of predication, ontological assertions are not ‘about’ Being in this sense. They rather predicate Being of entities, taking the form: ‘Entitie(s) e (of type T) as entities are F’. Such assertions are true, iff for e to be or be some way is to be F, or F some way. In defence of this account, I show (1) that both simple and complex ontological assertions apparently featuring ‘Being’ as a referential expressions have non-referential, exegetically favoured readings fitting this form, (2) that a standard reading of ontic predication can be extended to a reading of ontological predication and (3) that this account of ontological predication can account for the close link Heidegger forges between Being and Understanding of Being, while avoiding collapsing into any form of idealism.
