The Ockham Society (Thursday - Week 7, HT26)

Abstract: In the epistemology of understanding, reductionists argue that understanding is a species of knowledge, while anti-reductionists maintain that understanding is distinct. Some anti-reductionists, most notably Alison Hills, argue that understanding can survive cases of Gettier luck: one can understand why something is the case without knowing why. Critics – both reductionists and some anti-reductionists – raise two objections. First, in such cases any apparent understanding fails to be genuinely about the particular subject. Second, without knowledge-level security the achievement is too ‘cheap’ to count as genuine understanding. By refining a Hillsian account, I show how understanding can survive Gettier luck while avoiding the aboutness worry. I then argue that the achievement objection misidentifies the norm governing understanding. Overall, this challenges the claim that knowledge is necessary for understanding and clarifies what understanding requires.

Registration: If you do not hold a university card, please contact the seminar convenor or admin@philosophy.ox.ac.uk at least two working days before a seminar to register your attendance.