Umut Baysan

Umut Baysan
Departmental Lecturer in Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science
St Anne’s College
umut.baysan@philosophy.ox.ac.uk

See personal webpage

Career:

 

2017 – present: Departmental Lecturer in Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science, Faculty of Philosophy and St Anne’s College, University of Oxford

2016 – 2017: Postdoctoral Researcher, Philosophy, University of Glasgow (Funded by the New Directions in the Study of Mind Project at the University of Cambridge)

2015 – 2016: University Teacher in Philosophy, University of Glasgow

2014 – 2015: Postdoctoral Researcher, Philosophy, University of Glasgow (Funded by the Emergence Project at Durham University)

 

Education:

 

2014: PhD in Philosophy, University of Glasgow
 

Journal Articles:

 

  1. “ Causal Emergence and Epiphenomenal Emergence ", Erkenntnis, forthcoming.
  2. "Why Incompatibilism and Mental Causation is Incompatable with Non-reductive Physicalism", (with Jonas Christensen), Inquiry, forthcoming.
  3. "Memory, Confabulation and Epistemic Failure", Logos and Episteme, forthcoming.
  4. " Epiphenomenal Properties ”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2018.
  5. “ Must Strong Emergence Collapse? ” (co-authored with Jessica Wilson ), Philosophica, 2018.
  6. “ Lawful Mimickers”, Analysis, 2017.
  7. “ A New Response to the New Evil Demon Problem ”, Logos and Episteme, 2017.
  8. “ Causal Powers and the Necessity of Realization ”, International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 2017.
  9. “ An Argument for Power Inheritance ”, Philosophical Quarterly, 2016.
  10. “ Realization Relations in Metaphysics ”, Minds and Machines, 2015. 

 

 

Book Chapters :

 

  1. “Emergence, Function, and Realization”, in S.C. Gibb. et. al. (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Emergence, Routledge, forthcoming.­
  2. “Sensory Substitution and Non-Sensory Feelings” (co-authored with David Suarez, Diana Acosta-Navas & Kevin Connolly), in F. Macpherson (ed.), Sensory Substitution and Augmentation, Oxford University Press, forthcoming.

Reference Article:

​

  1. “ Realization ”, Oxford Bibliographies in Philosophy, Oxford University Press, 2015.

 

Book Reviews :

 

  1. “Review of The Multiple Realization Book by T. Polger and L. Shapiro”, Analysis, 2017.
  2. “Review of Qualia and Mental Causation in a Physical World by T. Horgan et. al.”, The Philosophical Quarterly, 2015.
  3. “Review of Mental Causation and Ontology by S.C. Gibb et. al.”, Mind, 2014.

 

Popular Writing :

 

  1. Invited blog post about “The Illusions Index”, (co-authored with Fiona Macpherson), The Brains Blog, forthcoming.
  2. Various entries for The Illusions Index ( http://www.illusionsindex.org), 2017.
  3. Invited blog post on “The Mental Causation Question and Emergence”, iCog Blog, 2016. (http://icog.group.shef.ac.uk/the-mental-causation-question-and-emergence/)

 
 

I specialise in philosophy of mind and metaphysics, with specific focus on the intersection of these two areas: metaphysics of mind. My research addresses questions about the possibility of epiphenomenal properties (properties without causal powers) both in philosophy of mind (e.g., "Are qualia epiphenomenal?") and metaphysics more generally (e.g., "What is it for a property to be epiphenomenal?"), as well as questions about emergence and realization (e.g., "Could there be strongly emergent properties?", "Are mental and other special-science properties multiply realized?", "What is it for a property to be realized by other properties?"). I also have research interests in philosophy of psychology and cognitive science (e.g., propositional attitudes; folk-psychological explanations; perception), epistemology (e.g., epistemic justification; memory errors), and philosophy of science (e.g., laws of nature; inter-level laws; dispositions).

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