Area of Specialisation > Epistemology

Professor Jennifer Nagel (University of Toronto): 'The strange divergence between intuitive and reflective knowledge attribution​​​​​​​'

Professor Jennifer Nagel (University of Toronto): 'Mental state recognition among animals'

Professor Jennifer Nagel (University of Toronto): 'Knowledge possession and knowledge transmission'

Professor Jennifer Nagel (University of Toronto): 'Knowledge and surprise'

Professor Jennifer Nagel (University of Toronto): 'Distinctively human mindreading'

Professor Jennifer Nagel (University of Toronto): 'Knowledge detection and the nature of knowledge'

David Thorstad | Oxford | Three Paradoxes of Bounded Rationality

Rachel Fraser | Oxford | ‘Practical Assurance’

Alexander Roberts (Oxford): 'De Re Modality without Counterparts'

Ella Whiteley (Sheffield): 'Objectifying by Attending'

Daniel Kodsi | Oxford | 'On Byrne’s Making Metaphysics'

David Builes (Princeton): 'The Metaphysics of Transworld Identity and the Epistemology of Self-Locating Belief'

Daniel Hoek (Virginia Tech): 'The Reality of Rainbows: Loose Talk and Ontology'

Kurt Sylvan (Southampton): 'Inference, Epistemic Priority, and the Presentational Account of Knowing'

Andreas Ditter (Oxford): ‘Essence and Grain’

Christopher Frugé (Oxford): 'Offloading Value'

Elizabeth Fricker (Oxford): 'Real and Fake Testimony'

Tena Thau (Oxford): 'The A Priori Case for Pacifism'

Alison Fernandes (Trinity College Dublin): 'Naturalism, Functionalism and the Metaphysics of Science'

Sophia Dandelet (Cambridge): 'Self-Deception and Believing for Reasons'

Nick Hughes (Oxford): ‘Non-Ideal Epistemic Rationality’

Katherine Hong (Oxford): 'The intended interpretation of higher-order languages'

Ofra Magidor (Oxford): 'Infinite Jesters: Deflationary Reflections on New Zeno'

Elizabeth Fricker (Oxford): 'Are there Second-Personal Reasons for Belief? McMyler on Testimonial Warrant'

David Boylan (Texas Tech and Glasgow): 'Persistence is Trivial'

Vincent Grandjean (Oxford): ‘The bare past’

James Ravi Kirkpatrick (Oxford): 'Counterpart theory as a foundation for natural language semantics'

Daniel Deasy (University College Dublin): 'World and Times as Propositions'

Amit Karmon (Oxford): 'Learning From Examples and the Paradox of the Ravens'

Teru Thomas (Oxford): 'Chance, Self-Location, and Anthropic Reasoning'

Alexander Geddes (Oxford): 'Identity and Mental Preservation'

Carlos Núñez (Oxford): 'Are there norms of rationality relating intention to acceptance?'

Henry Ian Schiller (Sheffield): 'Informational Chauvinism'

Sam Carter (Dianoia Institute ACU): 'Inquiry and Dogmatism'

Joe Gough (Oxford): 'Kinds of Eliminativism'

Katie Steele (ANU): 'Evidential Luck” and (Un)Fair Treatment'

Nick Hughes (Oxford): 'Non-Ideal Epistemic Rationality'

Alexander Bird (Cambridge): 'Special Composition for Objects and Properties: Information and Inference'

Annina Loets (Humboldt): 'Inexact Ability'

Lucy Campbell | Warwick | Agentialism about Self-Knowledge: Some Sceptical Thoughts (Joint Work With Alexander Greenberg)

Richard Pettigrew | Bristol | Epistemic Risk and the Demands of Rationality

Lani Watson | Oxford | The Right To Know: Epistemic Rights and Why We Need Them

Julien Dutant | KCL | A Theory of Degrees of Justification

CANCELLED

Lizzie Fricker | Oxford

Nick Hughes | Oxford | Epistemic Dilemmas Defended

Barry Maguire | Stanford | Jack Woods | Leeds

Alex Worsnip | UNC Chapel Hill | Ideal Epistemological Theory as Ideology: The Case of Higher-Order Evidence

Endre Begby | Simon Fraser

Carolina Flores | Rutgers | Resistant Beliefs, Responsive Believers

Silvia Milano | Oxford | Carina Prunkl | Oxford

Eliot Michaelson | KCL | Iffy Know How

Martin Smith | Edinburgh | Risky Belief

Michael Hannon | Nottingham

Mona Simion | Glasgow | Resistance to Evidence and the Normativity of Inquiry

Grace Helton | Princeton

Sinan Dogramaci | Ray Buchanan | UT Austin | Belief about Probability

Daniel Kodsi | Are Doxastic Attitudes Deliberative Dispositions?

Rachel Fraser | Oxford

Sven Rosenkranz | Barcelona

Matthew McGrath | Rutgers

Maya Krishnan | Oxford | Two new problems for ideal reasoners

Jennifer Nagel | Toronto

Steven Diggin | Oxford

Kabir Bakshi | Oxford | 'Against Indirect Confirmation'

Bernhard Salow | Oxford

Ema Sullivan-Bissett | Birmingham

Silvia Milano | Oxford | Carina Prunkl | Oxford

Sara Aronowitz | Arizona

Zoe Jenkin | Washington St. Louis

David Boylan | Texas Tech | 'Evidence and Conditional Propositions'

Katia Vavova | Mount Holyoke

Emmalon Davis | Michigan | 'Democratic Propaganda'

Miriam Schoenfield | UT Austin

Brian Hedden | ANU | 'Counterfactual Decision Theory'

Berislav Marusic | Edinburgh

Sam Fletcher | 'Evidence in Classical Statistics'

Moss, Sarah | "The case for probabilistic contents"