|2015 -||Kimberly J. Jenkins Distinguished University Professor of New Technologies, Duke University|
|2015 -||Professor of Philosophy, Duke University|
|2011 -||Professor of Computer Science, Duke University|
|2011 -||Professor of Economics, Duke University|
|2006 - 2011||Assistant Professor of Computer Science, Duke University|
|2006 - 2011||Assistant - Professor of Economics, Duke University|
|2006||Ph.D. in Computer Science, Carnegie Mellon University|
|2003||M.S. in Computer Science, Carnegie Mellon University|
|2001||A.B. in Applied Mathematics, Harvard University|
|Forthcoming||Vincent Conitzer. The Personalized A-Theory of Time and Perspective. Dialectica, forthcoming.|
Caspar Oesterheld and Vincent Conitzer. Extracting Money from Causal Decision Theorists. The Philosophical Quarterly, 2021.
Vincent Conitzer. A Puzzle about Further Facts. Erkenntnis, June 2019, Volume 84, Issue 3, pp. 727-739.
Vincent Conitzer. Designing Preferences, Beliefs, and Identities for Artificial Intelligence. In Proceedings of the Thirty-Third AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-19), pp. 9755-9759.
Vincent Conitzer. The AI debate must stay grounded in reality. Prospect (in association with the British Academy), March 6, 2017.
|2016||Vincent Conitzer. Artificial intelligence: where's the philosophical scrutiny? Prospect, May 4, 2016.|
|2016||Vincent Conitzer. On Stackelberg Mixed Strategies. Synthese (special issue on Logic and the Foundations of Decision and Game Theory), March 2016, Volume 193, Issue 3, pp. 689-703.|
|2015||Vincent Conitzer. Can rational choice guide us to correct de se beliefs? Synthese, December 2015, Volume 192, Issue 12, pp. 4107-4119.|
|2015||Vincent Conitzer. A Dutch Book against Sleeping Beauties Who Are Evidential Decision Theorists. Synthese, Volume 192, Issue 9, pp. 2887-2899, October 2015.|
|2015||Vincent Conitzer. A Devastating Example for the Halfer Rule. Philosophical Studies, Volume 172, Issue 8, pp, 1985-1992, August 2015.|
Full list of publications available on my website
I am primarily known for my work in artificial intelligence (AI), especially its intersection with game theory, social choice theory, and mechanism design. I work on the problem of automated moral decision making, and am broadly interested in ethical, societal, and policy aspects of AI. I also work on foundational questions of how we should think about AI "agents" and this connects to formal epistemology - especially problems such as the Sleeping Beauty problem - and in turn to philosophy of mind and metaphysics (why *this* experience?).